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BEYOND STANDING: A SEARCH FOR A NEW
SOLUTION IN ANIMAL WELFARE
Shigehiko Ito*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a researcher in an animal laboratory
and you suspect that the treatment of the animals in your
laboratory may violate federal law. What can you do? The
extent of legal protection that can and should be afforded to
animals against abuse, cruelty, pain, and suffering imposed
by humans is an ongoing debate among legal scholars.1 The
traditional conception of animals as property has limited the
extent of their protection under the American legal system.2
However, at least one academic has suggested that suffering
is the real issue, and is a sufficient reason to expand the
current scope of legal protection for animals.3
The Animal Welfare Act ("AWA") was enacted by
Congress to promote animal welfare at the federal level,4 but
there are numerous problems with this statute that have
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; M.A., Psychology, Vanderbilt University; Sc.B.,
Neuroscience, Brown University.
1. See, e.g., Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A
Review of Standing under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
795 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for
Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Standing for Animals]; Joshua E. Gardner, Note, At the
Intersection of Constitutional Standing, Congressional Citizen-Suits, and the
Humane Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen the Animal Welfare Act,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 330 (2000).
2. See Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property-Changing Concepts, 25 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 571, 572 (2001); Thomas G. Kelch, Article: Toward a Non-Property
Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 531-41 (1998); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 398-400 (2003)
[hereinafter Sunstein, The Rights of Animals].
3. See Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, supra note 2, at 401.
4. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 795.
377
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 46
rendered it ineffective.5 First, its language and standards are
unworkably vague.6 Second, it does not contain a private
right of action provision, creating a barrier for plaintiffs
attempting to access the federal courts.7 Third, the United
States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") has been unable
to enforce the AWA effectively.8 Finally, the formalistic
requirements of the standing doctrine9 have prevented
organizations and individuals from bringing animal welfare
claims before a court of law.10
It is difficult to make claims concerning injuries to
animals because courts are unwilling to grant standing to
animals themselves.' Consequently, a human plaintiff must
claim an injury suffered in association with an animal's
injury.2 Although controversial, a claim of aesthetic injury
suffered as a result of observing animals in conditions that
violate AWA standards is sufficient for standing purposes, 3
and has proven to be the most effective way for a third party
5. See Karen L. McDonald, Comment, Creating a Private Cause of Action
Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402-05 (1986).
6. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 795-96.
7. See Deawn A. Hersini, Can't Get There From Here... Without
Substantive Revision: The Case for Amending the Animal Welfare Act, 70 UMKC
L. REV. 145, 149 (2001).
8. McDonald, supra note 5, at 404-05.
9. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article III of the United
States Constitution, "the plaintiff must meet several requirements in order for a
federal court to adjudicate the case." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62 (2d ed. 2002). The first set of requirements
is constitutional, and cannot be overridden by statute. Id. First, the plaintiff
must have suffered or imminently will suffer an injury. Id. Second, the
plaintiffs injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. Id. Third,
a favorable court decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. The
prudential requirements are not based on the Constitution, but on prudent
judicial administration. Id. at 63. In contrast to the constitutional
requirements, Congress may override prudential limits by statute. Id. at 63.
There are three requirements:
First, a party generally may assert only his or her own rights and
cannot raise claims of third parties not before the court. Second, a
plaintiff may not sue as a taxpayer who shares general grievances with
all other taxpayers.... Third, a party must raise a claim within the
zone of interests protected by the statute in question.
Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
10. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 801 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
11. See id. at 804-06.
12. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
13. See id.
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plaintiff to ensure enforcement of the AWA. 14 Unfortunately,
while this type of claim gives plaintiffs access to the courts, it
is ineffective for animal protection purposes because it only
indirectly addresses the issue of injuries suffered by
animals."'
This comment will discuss the history of the AWA and
the various problems with the statute, as well as other legal
mechanisms for promoting animal welfare. 6  Effective
protection of animals requires a change in the way our legal
system regards animals. There are several possible solutions:
(1) amend the AWA to include a private right of action
provision; 7 (2) relax the formalistic standards of the standing
doctrine;' 8 or (3) amend the AWA to create and enforce more
specific guidelines to protect animals by creating either a new
subdivision within the USDA, or a new agency specializing in
animal welfare issues. 9
Given the historical difficulties in amending the AWA
and in overcoming the standing doctrine, 20 the third solution
14. See Aaron W. Proulx, Note, Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman: A
Common Law Basis for Animal Rights, 29 STETSON L. REV. 495 (1999); Rob Roy
Smith, Standing on Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal Welfare
Litigation After Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L.
989, 996-99 (1999); Fiona M. St. John-Parsons, Comment, "Four Legs Good, Two
Legs Bad": The Issue of Standing in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Glickman and its Implications for the Animal Rights Movement, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 895 (1999); infra note 188 and accompanying text.
15. See St. John-Parsons, supra note 14, at 932-33.
16. It will not, however, address the moral, philosophical and historical
questions regarding animal rights in the context of the American legal system.
See generally Kelch, supra note 2, at 531-41 (discussing the legal status of
animals as property).
17. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 353-57; Hersini, supra note 7, passim;
Katharine M. Swanson, Carte Blanche for Cruelty: The Non-Enforcement of the
Animal Welfare Act, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 937, 963-65 (2002); Sunstein,
supra note 1, at 1367 ("Congress should grant a private cause of action both to
injured persons and to animals themselves.. .. "); Adam Kolber, Comment,
Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes,
54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 203-04 (2001).
18. Kolber, supra note 17, at 202-04 (proposing that animals, particularly
great apes, should be granted standing); McDonald, supra note 5, at 426-30
(arguing that animal welfare groups in public nuisance actions should be
granted standing); Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1, at 1367
(asserting that animals should be granted standing).
19. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 357-59.
20. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1026-27 (stating that proposed legislation
in the 1980s to amend the AWA to include a citizen suit provision in order "to
give individuals standing to sue for enforcement of the act" did not survive the
House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government Regulations).
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proposed would likely be the most effective. A new
subdivision within the USDA or a new agency with
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and investigative authority would
be the most effective means of developing and enforcing a
comprehensive program regulating animal treatment,
particularly in the area of scientific research. Such an agency
is necessary to replace or supplement the limited regulatory
power of the USDA, which has proven ineffective in
promulgating regulations and investigating violations of the
law.2
1
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Animal Welfare Act and its History
The United States Congress originally enacted the AWA
in 1966 as the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act ("LAWA"). 22
Its primary objective was to prevent companion animals from
being stolen from their homes and sold to research facilities.23
Prior to the LAWA, numerous attempts were made to
introduce and pass bills in Congress that would have
regulated the use of animals in experiments.24 Such efforts
were unsuccessful and were met by strong opposition from
the scientific community. 25 The LAWA, the first successful
piece of legislation on the subject of laboratory animals, had
little relevance to these earlier attempts to regulate at the
21. Swanson, supra note 17, at 950-55.
22. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
23. Id.
24. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAw 187-90 (1995).
The first significant attempt to regulate the use of animals in scientific research
was proposed legislation aimed at banning vivisection in the District of
Columbia. See id. at 187. The legislation consisted of the general goals of
restricting painful experiments on animals and instituting a licensing
procedure. Id.
25. See id. at 187-90. For example, opponents of the vivisection legislation
contended that it would invade a researcher's traditional freedom not to be
regulated. See id. at 188. The National Academy of Sciences argued that this
legislation would impede scientific progress. See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 1049, at
127 (statement of Wolcott Gibbs, president of the National Academy of
Sciences)). Two leaders in the opposition movement were William Welch of
Johns Hopkins and Henry Bowditch of Harvard, who formed a committee of
leading scientific organizations and gathered signatures of researchers around
the country in support of their statement opposing the bill. Id. In addition,
researchers were opposed to visits to their laboratories by inspectors. Id.
380 [Vol: 46
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federal level.26 Because animals were considered property
under the common-law tradition,27 the main purpose of the
LAWA was to protect a person's property from theft.28
The LAWA was opposed by the scientific community,
29
and doubts arose as to whether the USDA was the proper
agency to administer this type of program. 3' Although the
USDA did not oppose the legislation, the Secretary of
Agriculture ("the Secretary") noted that the USDA's main
function pertained to livestock and poultry and that "there is
question as to whether it would not be more desirable that a
program such as that in question be administered by a
Federal agency more directly concerned."31 This statement
suggested that perhaps from the start, another federal agency
should have handled animal treatment issues in the context
of scientific research.
The LAWA had four primary parts.3 2 First, the Secretary
was authorized to "promulgate humane standards and record-
keeping requirements governing the purchase, handling, or
sale of dogs or cats by dealers or research facilities." 33 The
Secretary could also "promulgate standards to govern the
humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of
26. See id. at 187-90.
27. See Kelch, supra note 2, at 533-35. First, holdings and statements of the
courts reflect the conception of animals as property. See, e.g., Bueckner v.
Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. App. 1994) (finding that dogs are personal
property). Second, the measurement of damages for injuring or killing an
animal is measured in the same way as injury to inanimate property. See, e.g.,
Peter Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages from the
Negligent or Intentional Killing of Your Pet Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
411, 411-12 (1989). Third, Stoic, Aristotelian, and Biblical beliefs of animals as
"things" influenced the common-law view. See Steven M. Wise, The Legal
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471, 518-29
(1996).
28. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 190-91.
29. Id. at 191. Opponents asserted that the bill originated from an
exaggeration regarding the problem of stolen animals, and that federal
regulation would increase the cost of acquiring animals, consequently
decreasing the total output of research. See id.
30. Id. at 191-92.
31. Id. at 192 (quoting Regulate the Transportation, Sale, and Handling of
Dogs and Cats Used for Research and Experimentation: Hearings on H.R. 9743
et al. Before the Subcomm. on Livestock and Feed Grains of the H. Comm. on
Agric., 89th Cong. 12 (2d Sess. 1966) (statement of Orville Freeman)).
32. Id. at 192.
33. Id. (quoting Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 12, 80
Stat. 350 (1966)).
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animals by dealers at research facilities."34 Second, the Act
required dealers to be licensed,35 and research facilities to be
registered.36 The LAWA also required dealers to keep a dog
or cat for at least five business days after acquiring one before
selling it, 37 and prohibited research facilities from buying
dogs or cats from anyone but a licensed dealer.3  Third, the
LAWA required research facilities to keep records of dogs and
cats,39 and dealers to mark or identify dogs and cats
transported, delivered, purchased, or sold in commerce.4 °
Fourth, the Secretary was permitted to impose various
penalties for violations, including suspension or revocation of
a dealer's license, and imprisonment of dealers for up to one
year and a fine of up to $1,000.41 Other penalties included
civil fines of $500 per day per violation for research facilities
that knowingly violated a USDA order to cease and desist.42
The LAWA was limited in scope in several ways. Due to
its definition of "animal," it covered and regulated only the
use of live dogs, cats, monkeys, guinea pigs, hamsters, and
rabbits.43 Importantly, the Secretary could not set standards
regarding the handling and care of animals during the
process of research or experimentation." Although the
LAWA required the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service ("APHIS"), an enforcement division of the USDA, to
inspect research facilities, it did not specify how often such
inspections had to occur.45
The Animal Welfare Act of 1970 (the "1970 Act")
amended the LAWA and expanded the scope of its coverage to
any warm-blooded animal that the Secretary determined "is
being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing,
34. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 192 (quoting Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act § 13).
35. Id. at 193 (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act §§ 3, 4).
36. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 6).
37. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 5).
38. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 7).
39. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 10).
40. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 193 (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act § 11).
41. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act §§ 19(a), (c)).
42. Id. (citing Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 20).
43. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 2(h), 80 Stat. 350,
350 (1966) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
44. Id. §§ 13, 18.
45. Id. § 16.
382 [Vol: 46
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experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet."46  It
expanded the definition of "research facility" to include "any
school (except an elementary or secondary school), institution,
organization, or person that uses or intends to use live
animals in research, tests, or experiments."47 It also directed
the Secretary to set standards for humane "handling,
housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation [and]
shelter" for laboratory animals .
48
The 1970 Act required the USDA to administer a
licensing procedure whereby all exhibitors, research
laboratories, and dealers were required to obtain a license
before conducting activities involving the use of animals.49
These facilities were required to undergo annual inspections
and renew licenses.50 The 1970 Act also increased penalties
for interference with government inspectors5 and expanded
discovery procedures for obtaining information.52  These
amendments were part of a "continuing commitment by
Congress to the ethic of kindness to dumb animals."53
However, like the LAWA, the 1970 amendments made it clear
that the Secretary could not affect the "design, outlines,
guidelines, or performance of actual research or
experimentation by a research facility as determined by such
research facility."54
Subsequently, amendments in 1976 (the "1976
Amendments") outlawed animal fighting5 and established
criminal penalties for violations. 6  They also extended
46. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 3(g), 84 Stat. 1560,
1561 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2000)).
47. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 193 (citing Animal Welfare Act of 1970 §
3(e) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(e) (2000)).
48. Animal Welfare Act of 1970 § 14 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(A)).
49. 7 U.S.C. § 2133 (2000).
50. Id. § 2143.
51. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 195 (citing Animal Welfare Act of 1970 §
17).
52. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 798 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2
(1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5105); see also Animal Welfare
Act of 1970 §§ 14, 17 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2143, 2146).
53. H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5104.
54. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 194 (quoting Animal Welfare Act of 1970 §
14).
55. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, § 17, 90
Stat. 417, 421 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (2000)).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 94-801, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
383
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coverage of the Act to intermediate handlers and carriers. 7
These amendments emphasized Congress's commitment to
"humane care and treatment" of animals in, or intended for,
use in research. 8 However, Congress gave the scientific
research community discretion in defining "humaneness."9
In 1985, Congress enacted the Improved Standards for
Laboratory Animals Act ("ISLAA"),6° which further amended
the AWA and resulted in the basic form of the statute in force
today. The amendments created a system of internal review
through the creation of Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committees ("IACUCs").6' Under ISLAA, every facility
covered by the AWA is required to create at least one IACUC
consisting of at least three members, one of whom must be a
veterinarian, and another individual who must not be
associated with the facility.62 IACUCs are required to inspect
facilities semi-annually and prepare reports on the
inspections explaining any violations of standards and
deviations from approved protocols. The IACUC is required
to notify the facility of any problems, and if the facility fails to
correct the problem, the IACUC must notify APHIS and
federal funding agencies.64 No remedy is specified in the
statute for cases in which IACUC does not comply with the
internal review requirements of ISLAA 5
In addition to IACUC regulations, each facility is also
required to submit its own report to the Secretary, stating
that the principal researcher considered alternatives to
painful procedures and complied with § 2143, along with
796-97.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 94-801. "Intermediate handler" is defined as "any
person.., who is engaged in any business in which he receives custody of
animals in connection with their transportation in commerce," and "carrier" is
defined as "the operator of any airline, railroad, motor carrier, shipping line, or
other enterprise, which is the business of transporting any animals for hire."
FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 195 (quoting Animal Welfare Act Amendments of
1976 § 4).
58. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976 § 1(b)(2) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1)).
59. See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A) (2000).
60. See Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2158-2159 (2000).
61. See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1).
62. See id.
63. Id. § 2143(b)(3)-4(A).
64. Id. § 2143(b)(4)(C).
65. See id. § 2143.
384 [Vol: 46
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explanations for deviating from any standard.6 6 Under these
requirements, painful procedures should not be permitted
without anesthetic unless the pain is necessary to the
experiment and the experimenter has considered
alternatives.
Furthermore, the Secretary is required to set
requirements for the exercise of dogs, a physical environment
for primates that promotes their psychological well-being, and
for the care, treatment, and minimization of pain and distress
of experimental animals.68 Specifically, Congress has directed
the Secretary to establish standards for: (1) the use of
anesthetics, analgesics, tranquilizing drugs, and euthanasia
when appropriate; 69 (2) the consideration by the principal
investigator of alternatives to any procedure likely to cause
pain or distress to the animal; 0 (3) the consultation with a
veterinarian in planning research protocols that could cause
pain to animals;7' and (4) the use of animals in only one major
operation, from which they are allowed to recover unless
scientific necessity dictates otherwise, or the Secretary deems
that special circumstances require further research to be
conducted.72 The researcher, however, still retains much
control over the use of animals because the Secretary is
prohibited from interfering in the actual research design.73
Under the AWA, Congress expressed commitment to the
"'three R's': reduction in the number of animals used,
refinement of cruel techniques, and replacement of animals
with plants and computer simulations,7 and provided "that
the work that's done behind the laboratory door will be done
with compassion and with care."75 With these goals in mind,
Congress enacted the AWA, which remains in force today.
66. Id. § 2143(a)(7)(A)-(B).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(7)(A)-(B).
68. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B)-3(A).
69. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 800 (citing S. REP. No. 99-145, at 593
(1985), as reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 2519).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat.
1354, 1645-50; 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000).
74. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 800 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. E1295 (1991)).
75. H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5103, 5104.
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B. The Standing Doctrine and Animal Welfare Cases
The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over a
"case or controversy. " 76 The Constitution does not explicitly
recite the requirements of standing, but the doctrine has
evolved through case law. 7
In order to qualify as a "case or controversy"78 and thus
have standing, a plaintiffs claim must satisfy three
constitutional elements. First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact," which is concrete and
particularized and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' 79 Second, the plaintiff must show that the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant and not the result of the independent action of
some third party.80  Third, it must be likely, and not
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.8 ' In addition, for causes of action brought under a
statute, the injury suffered by the plaintiff must come within
the "zone of interest" of the statute.8 2 Several cases illustrate
how courts have applied this doctrine."
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 4 the Supreme Court held that
an organization bringing an action in federal court must show
that an individual, personal, particularized injury was
suffered by one or more of its members to satisfy the "injury
in fact" requirement for standing.8 8 The petitioner was an
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
77. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 60.
78. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
79. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). But see Cass
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan?] (arguing that the standing requirements recited in Lujan are a
misinterpretation of the Constitution, have no support in the text or history of
Article III, and are an invention of recent federal judges).
80. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
81. Id. at 561.
82. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
83. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y,
478 U.S. 221 (1986); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Alaska Fish &
Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988
(1988); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th
Cir. 1985); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
84. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727.
85. See id. at 735.
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organization with "a special interest in the conservation and
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges, and
forests of the country," and brought suit for declaratory relief
and an injunction to prevent federal officials from approving a
planned ski resort.8 6 Although the function of the petitioner
organization was to promote the preservation of the
environment in this area and had demonstrated a long-term
commitment, the Court dismissed its claim for lack of
standing because the Sierra Club did not allege that any
members of its organization would suffer individual, personal
injuries." This decision indicated that individual members
must use the resource in question in order to satisfy the
"injury in fact" requirement. 8
In his dissent, Justice William 0. Douglas questioned
why the natural resources themselves, such as trees, could
not bring an action and why an action must be brought on
behalf of a person.8 9 He noted that ships and corporations
were permitted as parties in certain cases.90 Justice Douglas
also reasoned that protection of environmental resources by
federal agencies was not sufficient because these agencies
"are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who
manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly
working relations, or who have that natural affinity.., which
in time develops between the regulator and the regulated."9'
Under Justice Douglas's view, individuals or organizations
that frequented the area and knew of its ecological value
could serve as guardians, but the resources themselves
should have standing.92
In Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps,93 the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the
Sierra Club rule and found that plaintiffs had standing to
enjoin the Director of the National Marine Fisheries Service
86. Id. at 730.
87. Id. at 735, 741.
88. See id. at 735 ("Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state
that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less they use it in
any way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the
respondents.").
89. Id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 745-46 (footnote omitted) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 749-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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from granting permits to kill Cape fur seals.94 The court held
that the plaintiffs satisfied the standing requirement "by
alleging injury to the recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and
educational interest of their members."95
The aesthetic interest of members was also sufficient for
standing purposes in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Society.96 In that case, the Supreme Court found
that the plaintiffs had standing where the Secretary of
Commerce was required to report to the President of the
United States Japan's violation of a whaling moratorium
contained in the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling.97 Had there been a violation, the President would
have been required to impose sanctions on Japan.98 The
Court found that the plaintiffs had standing based on injury
to their interest in whale watching and studying.99
Similarly, in Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation v.
Dunkle, °° wildlife conservation groups challenged cooperative
agreements that permitted the hunting of migratory birds in
Alaska by suing the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service. 1 ' The court relied on Sierra Club and held that the
defendants' actions would injure "those who wish to hunt,
photograph, observe, or carry out scientific studies on
migratory birds."102
Organizations have not always been successful in
overcoming the standing requirement in their attempts to
protect animals against abuse. In Animal Lovers Volunteer
Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger,1°3 the plaintiff organization, which
94. Id. at 1004.
95. Id. at 1007.
96. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4
(1986). The Court determined that the plaintiffs had an aesthetic interest
because they "undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient 'injury in fact' in that the
whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by
continued whale harvesting, and this type of injury is within the 'zone of
interests' protected by the Pelly and Packwood Amendments [regulating
whaling]." Id.
97. Id. at 223.
98. Id. at 239.
99. Id. at 231 n.4.
100. Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988).
101. Id. at 933.
102. Id. at 937.
103. Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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dedicated itself to preventing the inhumane treatment of
animals, brought an action to enjoin the Navy from shooting
feral goats on Navy property. 10 4 The court reasoned that if
the plaintiff was trying to protect the goats as endangered
species or was trying to protect the plants endangered by the
goats, the plaintiffs would have had a stronger argument for
standing purposes.' 5  Similarly, if the organization had
shown that the Navy's program affected its members'
aesthetic or ecological surroundings, the plaintiffs position
might have been different. 10 6 The court asserted that there
was "no such cognizable injury to [the organization's]
members" and concluded that "[a] mere assertion of
organizational interest in a problem, unaccompanied by
allegations of actual injury to members of the organization, is
not enough to establish standing."0 The court held that
because the organization "has not differentiated its concern
from the generalized abhorrence other members of the public
may feel,"'08 it failed to "demonstrate an interest that is
distinct from the interest held by the public at large,"109 a
requirement for standing under Sierra Club." °
The legal concept of standing changed dramatically after
the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,"' in which the Court narrowly construed the
meaning of "injury."" 2 The Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge a rule
interpreting the Endangered Species Act as being applicable
only to government actions within the United States or on the
high seas."' The plaintiffs claimed that the lack of
consultation involving the federal government's activities
abroad would lead to an increased rate of extinction of
endangered species in other countries." 4
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
104. Id. at 937.
105. Id. at 938.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 939.
109. Weinberger, 765 F.2d at 939.
110. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-41 (1972).
111. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
112. Id. at 560-61.
113. Id. at 557-58.
114. Id. at 558-59.
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standing to sue.115 Although certain organization members
may have visited and observed the habitats of endangered
species, there was no "showing how damage to the species
will produce 'imminent' injury .... , Further, the Court
stated that
an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had visited
before-where they will presumably, this time, be
deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the
endangered species-is simply not enough. Such "some
day" intentions-without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be--do not support a finding of the "actual or
imminent" injury that our cases require. 117
The Court observed that even if a statute authorizes a
citizen-suit provision, it is insufficient for standing purposes
without the satisfaction of the constitutional elements of
standing.1 ' Lujan remains good law because no cases have
yet altered its strict standing requirements.
C. No Private Right of Action Under the AWA
In addition to standing, another factor that has imposed
a burden on plaintiffs attempting to bring suit in federal
court is the lack of a private right of action under the AWA.119
One of the most significant cases regarding the issue of a
private right of action and the AWA is International Primate
Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc.20
The issue was whether a group of private individuals could
challenge a medical researcher's compliance with federal
115. Id. at 578.
116. Id. at 564.
117. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
118. See id. at 573-78. The Court was concerned that ignoring the concrete
injury requirement would violate the separation of powers. See id. The Court
explained that
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"
[as required by] Art. II, § 3.
Id. at 577.
119. See Hersini, supra note 7, at 149.
120. Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799
F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
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standards for the care of laboratory animals. 2' The principal
complainant, Alex Pacheco, worked in the laboratory of the
principal defendant, Dr. Edward Taub.122 Taub was the head
of the Behavioral Biology Center of the Institute of
Behavioral Research ("IBR"), and the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") funded his work. 23 His research studied the
capacity of monkeys to learn to use a limb after their nerves
had been severed.
1 24
Pacheco concluded from his observations that IBR did not
provide its monkeys with sufficient food or water, nor did it
maintain a sanitary environment or adequate veterinary
care. 25 Pacheco brought other researchers to IBR to confirm
his observations. 26  He collected affidavits from these
visitors, as well as his own statements and photographs, and
asked the police department to investigate possible violations
of state statutes. 27 The police obtained a warrant and seized
seventeen monkeys involved in Taub's experiments. 128  The
monkeys were transferred to an NIH facility under a court
order. 129 Taub was convicted of six counts of animal abuse,
which were later reversed. 3 0
In their attempt to prevent IBR from regaining custody of
the monkeys, the plaintiffs argued that they would suffer
financial and non-financial injuries if IBR regained custody.' 3'
The court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing,
rejected all of the plaintiffs' financial 32 and non-financial 133
121. Id. at 935.
122. Id. at 935-36. Pacheco also worked for various organizations seeking
protection of animals. Id.
123. Id. at 936.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 936-37.
131. Id. at 937.
132. Plaintiffs asserted that first, their payment of taxes entitled them to
assurance that the NIH and IBR both respect the law. Int'l Primate Prot.
League, 799 F.2d at 937. The court stated that this argument was rejected by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974),
which held that payment of taxes does not give rise to the authority to enforce
regulatory restrictions. Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 937-38.
Secondly, the plaintiffs argued that they contributed to the maintenance of the
monkeys after the police seized them and before NIH took possession. Id. at
938. The court reasoned that such expenditure was wholly voluntary, and did
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injury arguments and thus denied standing.134 It noted that
the exclusive jurisdiction of the AWA lies with the USDA, the
administrative agency designated by Congress to enforce the
AWA.135 In its analysis regarding the purpose of the AWA,'
36
the court stated that although the Act seeks to ensure that
"animals intended for use in research facilities . . . are
provided humane care and treatment,"137 there is no
indication that Congress intended the AWA to impede
progress in medical research.
138
The court further emphasized that although the AWA
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to "promulgate standards
to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and
transportation of animals," it does not authorize the
Secretary to regulate the design of experiments and the
content of research.1 39  Under the AWA, the extent of the
Secretary's congressional authority in regulating the
conditions of facilities is performing inspections to determine
whether a research facility complies with standards.'40
The court recognized two purposes underlying the
AWA." The first is "a commitment to administrative
supervision of animal welfare" and the second is "the
subordination of such supervision to the continued
independence of research scientists.' 42 It noted that the
Secretary is not authorized to regulate the design of
not give rise to an interest in the monkeys. Id.
133. The court stated that the plaintiffs' description of themselves as having
'a personal interest in the preservation and encouragement of civilized and
humane treatment of animals," was not a sufficient injury because the Supreme
Court held in Sierra Club that "a mere interest in the problem" was not
sufficient to satisfy standing. Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 938
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)). The court also
rejected a more specific argument that the plaintiffs would suffer injury from
disruption of their personal relationships with the monkeys by their return to
IBR, reasoning that the "plaintiffs have been with the monkeys primarily
because of this litigation." Id. The court further stated that the "plaintiffs
could not see the monkeys in the IBR laboratory if the defendants satisfied all
requirements of care." Id.
134. Int'l Primate Prot, League, 799 F.2d at 937.
135. See id. at 939.
136. See id. at 939-40.
137. Id. at 939 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1986)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (construing 7 U.S.C. § 2143).
140. Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 939 (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 2146).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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experiments and that the Secretary's enforcement authority
does not authorize him to confiscate animals in use.
143
Therefore, Congress intended the goals of the statute to be
realized through administrative enforcement with a right of
judicial review for an aggrieved facility, and not through
private lawsuits. 1
The court finally concluded that because Congress
intended the administrative remedy to be the exclusive
remedy, it would be against the aims of Congress to grant the
plaintiffs standing to sue through a private cause of action.
145
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, 46 and
subsequent attempts by Congress to amend the AWA to
include a private cause of action have been unsuccessful.
147
D. Suing Under the Administrative Procedure Act as an
Alternative
Because the AWA has no private right of action
provision, 48 an alternative for plaintiffs is to sue the USDA
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failure to
promulgate and enforce regulations of the AWA. 1 9 A plaintiff
suing under the APA must satisfy both constitutional and
prudential requirements for standing.'
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter,15 1 the plaintiffs
sued the USDA asserting that the USDA failed to include
birds, rats, and mice as "animals" within the meaning of the
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799
F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
147. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 354-55 (citing H.R. 2345, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 3223, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1770, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 4535,
99th Cong. (1986)).
148. Swanson, supra note 17, at 943-44.
149. Id. at 945. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides
judicial review to any person "suffering a legal wrong because of an agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of the relevant statute." Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923,
926 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)).
150. See Swanson, supra note 17, at 945. See also supra note 9 for a
discussion of the standing requirements.
151. Animal Legal Def Fund, 760 F. Supp. 923 (D.D.C. 1991), vacated sub
nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy 1), 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
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AWA. 152 In order to satisfy standing requirements under the
APA, plaintiffs were required to show that they suffered an
injury in fact and that the injury was within the "zone of
interests" protected by the AWA.' 53
The court held that the plaintiffs satisfied both
requirements for standing.15 First, because the primary
function of the plaintiffs' organizations was to disseminate
information concerning the number of animals used in
experiments, their inability to obtain and convey this
information to their members due to the AWA standard
constituted an injury.155  Second, because the plaintiffs
wanted to. provide information to their members, their
interests were not tangential and thus fell within the "zone of
interests" that the AWA sought to protect. 156 The plaintiffs'
goal of disseminating information was the same as the goal
Congress sought to achieve by requiring annual reporting by
research facilities. 5 7
Similarly, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Secretary of
Agriculture,5 ' the plaintiffs proceeded under the APA and
were also required to show that they had an injury in fact and
that they were within the zone of interests protected by the
AWA.' 59 The plaintiffs challenged regulations concerning
canine exercise and primate psychological well-being,'6 ° and
152. Id. at 926-27.
153. Id. at 926.
154. Id. at 927-28.
155. Id. at 927. This is similar to the informational injury alleged by the
plaintiff in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). See also
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Havens, an African-
American woman inquired at an apartment complex as to whether apartments
were available and was falsely told that none were available. Havens Realty
Corp., 455 U.S. at 368. She instituted a suit under the Fair Housing Act, and
the defendants argued that she had no standing to sue because she had no
intention of renting an apartment. Id. at 363. The defendants also argued that
although the statute granted plaintiff the right to sue, it was defective because
she could not be injured without any intent to rent an apartment. Id. at 373.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and concluded that Congress gave
the public a general right to information regarding racist housing practices. Id.
156. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923, 927-28 (D.D.C.
1991).
157. Id. at 928.
158. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Sec'y of Agric., 813 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy (Espy I/), 29 F.3d 720
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 885.
160. Id. at 885-86.
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the trial court held that the USDA had failed to comply with
the congressional directives in the 1985 amendments to the
AWA. 161  Because the defendants did not challenge the
plaintiffs' standing in this case, the court did not rule on the
162issue.
Following the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision
in Lujan,63 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia vacated both Yeutter 64 and Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Secretary of Agriculture65 on grounds of standing. In
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy 1),166 the court
denied standing to two organizations and two individual
plaintiffs.'67  The court distinguished Havens,68  where
Congress provided an explicit right to information regarding
racist housing practices,'169 because no such right to
information existed under the AWA.170 The court found that
the organizational plaintiffs did not fall within the "zone of
interests" of the AWA because they did not assert any rights
or interests that the AWA explicitly protected. 171 Therefore,
the court concluded that the organizations did not meet the
requirements to satisfy standing.172
One of the individual plaintiffs was Dr. Patricia Knowles,
a psychobiologist who had previously worked in laboratories
regulated by the AWA.1 3 She argued that because rats and
mice were not covered under the AWA, the inhumane
treatment of these animals had affected her ability to obtain
research results in the past and would continue to do so.
174
The court based its analysis on Lujan's determination that an
161. Id. at 891.
162. See id.
163. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see supra Part II.B.
164. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy 1), 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1994), vacating as moot Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923
(D.D.C. 1991).
165. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy II), 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir.
1994), vacating as moot Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Sec'y of Agric., 813 F. Supp.
882 (D.D.C. 1993).
166. Espy I, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
167. See id. at 504.
168. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 454 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
169. Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 501.
170. Id. at 502.
171. Id. at 503-04.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 499-500.
174. Id. at 500.
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"injury in fact" must be imminent for standing purposes. 7 '
Because Knowles was not currently involved in any research
activities covered under the AWA, the court concluded that
any injury that she might suffer in the future would be too
speculative. 76  The Court stated in Lujan that "[piast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present
case or controversy.., if unaccompanied by any continuing,
present adverse effects."'77 For this reason, the court denied
standing to Dr. Knowles.' 7
8
A similar claim by an individual plaintiff was rejected by
the appellate court in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Espy (Espy 1/).17' Dr. Roger Fouts, a primatologist and
director of the Chimpanzee and Human Communications
Institute at Central Washington University, argued that the
vagueness of the USDA regulations prevented him from
making plans for the design of his research institute because
he feared being held liable as a result of inadvertent non-
compliance with the USDA regulations."8 ° The court held
that if the institute did not comply, it would be the university,
rather than Fouts himself, that would be liable; therefore,
any injury incurred would not be suffered by Fouts. 181
Further, the court held that Fouts's injury was too
speculative because the USDA might determine that Fouts's
plan was in compliance with the regulations, and therefore no
injury would have occurred.'18  Dr. Fouts thus lacked
standing because he did not allege injury sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional requirements.183
175. Espy I, 23 F.3d at 500
176. Id. at 501.
177. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (citing City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
178. Espy I, 23 F.3d at 501.
179. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy I), 29 F.3d 720 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
180. Id. at 725.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 725-26.
183. Id. at 725.
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E. Aesthetic Injury: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Glickman 14
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,
individual plaintiffs alleged they suffered aesthetic injury
during visits to animal exhibitions where they observed
primates living under conditions that violated the AWA
standards."' 5 The Supreme Court had previously recognized
similar injuries as sufficient to satisfy Article III standing
requirements. 186
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that one of the plaintiffs, Marc Jurnove, had standing to
sue to enforce the AWA. 8 7 Jurnove worked throughout his
adult life as a volunteer and an employee for various human
and animal relief and rescue organizations. 8 8 As a result, he
was familiar with the needs and proper treatment of
animals. 8 9 Between May 1995 and June 1996, he visited the
Long Island Game Farm Park and Zoo (the "Game Farm") at
least nine times.' 90 Jurnove indicated in his affidavit that
during his visits he observed primates in conditions that
violated AWA standards. 91  He subsequently contacted
government agencies, including the USDA, to get help for
these animals.'92  Although Jurnove's efforts led to an
inspection by the USDA, the inspectors found the Game Farm
in compliance with all standards. 19 3
The plaintiffs alleged that the USDA failed to adopt
184. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
185. Id. at 430-31.
186. Id. at 432. In Lujan, the Court stated that "the desire to use or observe
an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a
cognizable interest for purpose of standing." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992); see supra Part II.B. In Japan Whaling Ass'n, the Court
recognized that the plaintiffs had "undoubtedly.. . alleged a sufficient 'injury in
fact' in that the whale watching and studying of their members will be
adversely affected by continued whale harvesting." Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986) (citing United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 727 (1972)).
187. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 429.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 429.
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specific minimum standards to protect primates'
psychological well-being under the AWA.194 The plaintiffs
also contended that although the "conditions that caused Mr.
Jurnove's aesthetic injury complied with current USDA
regulations[,] . . . lawful regulations would have prohibited
those conditions and protected Mr. Jurnove from injuries that
he described in his affidavit."195
The court held that Jurnove satisfied the constitutional
and prudential requirements for standing. 96 First, Jurnove
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement, because he suffered a
concrete and particularized injury to his aesthetic interest in
observing animals living under humane conditions. 97 The
194. Id. at 430.
195. Id. at 430-31.
196. Id. at 431. But see id. at 445-55 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent
was concerned that expanding the standing doctrine would increase federal
judicial power at the expense of that of the other political branches. See id. at
455. It criticized the majority with regard to the three elements required for
constitutional standing. Id. at 447-55.
First, with regard to the injury-in-fact requirement, the dissent noted
that "Supreme Court cases addressing aesthetic injury resulting from
observation of animals have been limited to cases in which governmental action
threatened to reduce the number of animals available for observation and
study." Id. at 447 (citing Humane Soc'y v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
Moreover, in this case, the plaintiffs injury is defined by what he found to be
aesthetically pleasing and was therefore subjective. Id. at 448. The dissent
stated that by recognizing a "'purely subjective' claim of injury that cannot be
measured by 'readily discernible standards,'" the majority "radically depart[ed]
from [this Circuit's] precedent." Id. at 449 (quoting Metcalf v. Nat'l Petroleum
Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Therefore, Jurnove's injury was not
"traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process."
Id. at 450 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
Second, with regard to causation, the dissent criticized the majority for
assuming that "the government causes everything that it does not prevent." Id.
at 452. Further, the dissent reasoned that "[wihat matters, under our
consistent case law, is whether the third party conduct follows directly on the
heels of a government decision that affirmatively approved that conduct." Id. at
453. Therefore, Jurnove had not sufficiently proved causation. Id.
Finally, with regard to redressability, the dissent emphasized that
constitutional standing requires it to "be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 454
(citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)). The dissent doubted that any
judicial order directing the USDA to set new regulations would redress
Jurnove's asserted injury because it was unclear what improvements would
satisfy Jurnove's aesthetic interests. Id. at 454. In addition, the dissent
believed that if the Game Farm decided to sell its primates to other facilities,
Jurnove's asserted injuries would not be redressed at all because he would no
longer be able to see them at the Game Farm. Id.
197. Id.
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court emphasized that Jurnove had a special interest in
observing animals living in humane conditions, and his
alleged injury was not merely abstract and uncognizable. 198
Moreover, Jurnove made clear that he had an aesthetic
interest in seeing exotic animals living in a fostering
environment by repeatedly visiting a particular animal
exhibition to observe particular animals there 99 and, as a
result, suffered a personal and individual injury.2 °°
Second, the court cited Supreme Court precedent in
explaining that a plaintiff satisfies "the causation
requirement for constitutional standing by demonstrating
that the challenged agency action authorizes illegal conduct
that allegedly caused the plaintiffs injuries."20 ' The court
applied this rule and held that Jurnove satisfied the
causation requirement. Accordingly, although the conditions
were in compliance with USDA standards, if the regulations
themselves were lawful, Jurnove would not have suffered his
aesthetic injury.20 2  According to the court, "the proper
comparison is between what the agency did and what the
plaintiffs allege the agency should have done under the
statute."
203
Third, the court determined that Jurnove met the
redressability requirement because tougher regulations
would either allow Jurnove to visit and observe animals in
more humane conditions or, if the Game Farm's owners
decided to close rather than comply with the new standards,
give Jurnove an opportunity to observe the animals in more
humane conditions elsewhere.20 4  Moreover, in Federal
Election Commission v. Akins,20 the Supreme Court held that
redressability does not require a plaintiff to establish that the
defendant agency will actually enforce any new binding
regulations against the regulated third party.
20 6
198. Id. at 432 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 (1974); Humane Soc'y
v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
199. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 432.
200. Id. at 433.
201. Id. at 440 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Orgs., 426 U.S. 26
(1976))
202. Id. at 439.
203. Id. at 441.
204. Id. at 443.
205. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
206. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 443 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 14-16).
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Consequently, although Jurnove was required to show that
new regulations, if promulgated and enforced, would redress
his alleged injury, he was not required to show that the
USDA would actually enforce the new regulations against the
Game Farm.
Finally, the court held that Jurnove's claim fell within
the "zone of interests" protected under the AWA's provisions
on animal exhibitions. °7 The court emphasized that the
congressional purpose of the statute did not need to benefit
the would-be plaintiff and that the issue was "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the
statute."20 8 Because the purpose of animal exhibitions was to
entertain and educate people, they would not make sense
unless the interests of human visitors were taken into
account. 2 9  Further, the intent of Congress in including
animal exhibitions within the AWA was to encourage the
monitoring of humane societies and their members.210
Because Jurnove was a regular viewer of animal exhibitions
regulated under the AWA, the court concluded that he fell
within the "zone of interests" that the statute protects.21 '
The Glickman decision provided a new avenue by which
plaintiffs could access the courts. Although the court did not
recognize standing for animals themselves, this case
demonstrated that standing was not an absolute barrier for
animal welfare plaintiffs and that a plaintiff who is in a legal
position to assert aesthetic injury can improve the treatment
and conditions of animals in captivity.
F. Animals as Plaintiffs
There have been a number of cases brought under
statutes other than the AWA where animals were named
plaintiffs. For example, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of
Land & Natural Resources, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit named a bird as a plaintiff under the
Endangered Species Act.212 The court stated that "[a]s an
207. Id. at 444.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 445.
211. Id.
212. Palla v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
400 [Vol: 46
2006] A NEW SOLUTION IN ANIMAL WELFARE 401
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act... the
bird (Loxiodes bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-
creeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right."213 Other courts
have recognized the Northern Spotted Owl, 214 the Mount
Graham Red Squirrel,21 5 and the Marbled Murrelet 2 6 as
plaintiffs. However, as the court in Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan
explained, "[i]n none of [these] cases did the defendants
challenge the suing species' standing or the propriety of
naming those species as plaintiffs."21 7
In cases where defendants challenged an animal
plaintiffs standing, courts have denied standing to the
animal plaintiff.21 ' Similarly, the court in Hawaiian Crow
commented that "in none of [these cases] did the species
appear as the only plaintiff."219  Recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied standing to the sole
animal plaintiff, Cetacean Community,220  where the
defendants challenged standing of the plaintiff.21 Therefore,
although courts have permitted animals to remain named as
plaintiffs, they have never explicitly granted standing to
1988).
213. Id. at 1107 (citation omitted).
214. See N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N.
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
215. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991).
216. See Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) ([A]s a protected specifies under the ESA [Endangered Species Act],
the marbled murrelet has standing to sue 'in its own right.'" (quoting Palila, 852
F.2d at 1107)).
217. Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991).
218. See id. The court interpreted the word "person" in the private suit
provision of the ESA not to include animals and denied standing for the 'Alala
(Hawaiian Crow). See id. at 551-53; see also Citizens to End Animal Suffering
& Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Mass.
1993) (concluding that a captive dolphin had no standing to challenge the
Aquarium's decision to transfer it to the Navy for testing).
219. Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 552.
220. 'Cetacean Community is the name chosen by the Cetaceans' self-
appointed attorney for all of the world's whales, porpoises, and dolphins."
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
221. See id. The court concluded that neither Congress nor the President
intended to authorize animals to sue under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 1179; see
also Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 551-52 (concluding that an animal
plaintiff is not a "person" and does not have authority to sue pursuant to the
ESA).
402 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 46
animals.222
Recently, the Ninth Circuit explained that the
statements from Palila are nonbinding dicta,223 although the
text of Article III does not explicitly limit the ability to bring a
claim in federal court to humans.224 If this is true, then the
question becomes whether Congress has passed a statute
authorizing an animal to bring a lawsuit.225 Currently, no
statute grants standing to animals.226 Without a private suit
provision in a statute authorizing animals to sue, courts are
likely to deny standing to animals.227
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Currently, our legal system does not offer an adequate
solution to the problem of animal abuse and protection. The
AWA has proven to be ineffective in achieving its purpose and
greatly favors the interests of researchers. Moreover, it has
been difficult for plaintiffs to litigate claims of possible AWA
violations in federal court because of the requirements of the
standing doctrine. 228 For these reasons, alternative solutions
are required in order to promote the larger goal of protecting
animals against human abuse and ultimately to promote
222. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991);
N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl
v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). But see Marbled Murrelet,
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
223. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173. The court explained that "[a]
statement is dictum when it is 'made during the course of delivering a judicial
opinion, but... is unnecessary to the decision in the case and [is] therefore not
precedential.'" Id. (quoting Best Life Assurance Co. v. Comm'r, 281 F.3d 828,
834 (9th Cir. 2002)). The court reasoned that in the previous three opinions in
this case, two by the district court, Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res.,
649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res.,
471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), and one by the Ninth Circuit, Palila v. Haw.
Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), standing for most of
the plaintiffs had been clear, and standing for the Palila was never disputed.
Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173-74. Therefore, there were no jurisdictional
concerns as to whether the Palila had standing. Id. at 1174.
224. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III; Sunstein,
Standing for Animals, supra note 1, at 1333).
225. Id. at 1176.
226. See Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1, at 1359.
227. See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176-79.
228. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy ), 23 F.3d 496
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy II), 29 F.3d 720
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
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animal welfare.
Specifically, in the context of scientific research, it is
important to weigh the benefits of animal research against
the pain and suffering inflicted upon animals used in
experiments. There are competing interests that support
both sides. One can easily dismiss the interests of animals by
regarding them as personal property and denying them any
rights. If, however, our society is willing to protect animals,
it must be done more effectively, efficiently, and vigorously.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the AWA
There are numerous problems with the current AWA that
render it ineffective in protecting the welfare of animals used
for scientific research. Primarily, the AWA does not regulate
the way in which animals are used in scientific research.229
The regulations that the AWA does impose concern
husbandry issues, such as the transportation of animals, and
the provision of food, water, and air to animals used in
scientific experiments.23 ° Such limited regulation reflects the
treatment of animals as the property of the research facility
and shows that "the only concern of the AWA is to ensure
that these resources are used efficiently, which, in this
situation, means that they produce reliable scientific data."
231
Congress, through its failure to pass the 1982 act that
required ethical merit review by the granting agency, showed
its intention to defer the regulation of the content of
experiments to the research community.
2 32
Congress has also specifically stated that the IACUC
cannot interfere with or regulate the "design, outlines, or
guidelines of actual research or experimentation by a
research facility as determined by such research facility,"
233
nor can it interfere in the conduct of actual research. 2 4 The
229. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000); Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-198, §§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat. 1354, 1645-50. See also Swanson, supra note
17, at 943.
230. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 201.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 202 (citing H.R. 6245, 97th Cong. (1982)).
233. Id. at 204 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i)).
234. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
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IACUC does not evaluate animal use by a set standard, but
by the "needs of the research facility,"235 and the approval of
only one member of an IACUC is required to approve an
experiment involving pain and distress. 6 Consequently, the
IACUC has no power or authorization to regulate the
treatment of animals in the research context.
Another problem with the AWA is that the statute
contains too many exceptions to its rules, which has resulted
in a loose set of standards. For example, researchers can
withhold tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia
when "scientifically necessary." 237 Researchers can also use
an animal in more than one major operative experiment from
which it is allowed to recover if it is a "scientific necessity," or
if the Secretary determines that it is a case of special
circumstances, 23 as long as the exceptions are specified in the
research protocol and the researcher files a report with the
IACUC. 239  By permitting these exceptions, Congress has
created loopholes for researchers at the expense of the pain
and suffering of animals.
The AWA is also problematic because it is full of vague
terminology and phrases. 240  For instance, § 2143(a)(2)(A)
uses the phrase "where the Secretary finds necessary. "241
Standards for the exercise of dogs depend on the "general
standards promulgated by the Secretary," and the
psychological well-being of primates is promoted through an
"adequate" physical environment.242 Research facilities are
required to make sure that pain and distress are
"minimized,"243 and the principal investigator is required to
"consider[] alternatives" to procedures that are likely to
produce pain or distress in an animal.2" As stated
previously, the statute also uses phrases such as "scientific
necessity," "necessary period of time," and "other special
235. Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1)).
236. FRANCIONE, supra note 24, at 205 (citing 9 C.F.R. § 2.31(d)(2) (1993)).
237. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(v) (2000).
238. Id. §§ 2143(a)(3)(D)(i)-(ii).
239. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(E).
240. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 795-96.
241. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(A).
242. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B).
243. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(A).
244. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(B).
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circumstances as determined by the Secretary. "245 These
broad, vague provisions do not set objective standards, and
either the Secretary or the researchers themselves have the
discretion to do what they feel is needed. Although Congress
has authority to give the Secretary discretion through
legislation, it is dangerous to do so in this context because it
involves the well-being of animate, living creatures. Such a
decision requires scientific expertise, preferably in the form of
a committee rather than an individual.
Another problem with the provisions of the AWA involves
the lack of enforcement. Research facilities are required to
"show upon inspection, and to report at least annually, that
the provisions of this Act are being followed and that
professionally acceptable standards governing the care,
treatment, and use of animals are being followed by the
research facility during actual research or
experimentation."2 46  However, this is simply a formality
because the Secretary cannot impose penalties on facilities
that do not comply with "professionally acceptable standards"
during actual research.247 The reporting requirement and
inspection thus have only a minimal effect in insuring
compliance with the AWA and the well-being of animals.
The purpose behind provisions requiring the principal
investigator to demonstrate that he or she has "considered"
alternatives to procedures likely to produce pain or distress, 248
and to provide an explanation for any deviation from
standards 249 is unclear. Such requirements also appear to be
formalities, which are unlikely to have any practical effect in
promoting the well-being of animals.
Finally, Congress's and the Secretary's understanding of
the procedures involved in animal research is also
questionable. For example, there is a fine line between what
constitutes husbandry issues and actual experimental design.
If an animal is required to be deprived of fluids in preparation
for an experiment, is this part of the design? One can argue
this constitutes a necessary procedure for the experiment.
245. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
246. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(7)(A).
247. See id. § 2143(a)(6)(A).
248. Id. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(i).
249. Id. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(iii).
251. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(A).
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However, one can just as easily argue that providing
adequate water and food to animals are husbandry issues,
which the Secretary is permitted to regulate.251 In sum,
although one may find at first glance that the AWA is well-
structured and organized to protect the well-being of
laboratory animals, a thorough analysis of the provisions
reveals that much of its provisions are mere formalities
without practicality.
B. Overcoming Standing
Currently the standing doctrine limits the types of
animal protection cases that can be litigated." Although
some courts have recognized animals as plaintiffs, most
courts have been reluctant to do so. 25 3
The AWA does not provide for a private right of action
and, consequently, plaintiffs have resorted to litigating claims
under the APA.25 4 Meeting the constitutional and prudential
requirements for standing has become difficult ever since the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the "injury in fact"
requirement in Lujan, which noted that even if a statute
included a citizen suit provision, a concrete and
particularized injury was still required.255
1. The "Injury in Fact" Barrier
The court in Espy I found that Dr. Knowles did not have
standing.256  Because she was not currently involved in
research and her plans to engage in further research were for
an undefined future time, the court concluded that her injury
was not "imminent."25 7 However, the court failed to consider
the interests of a scientific researcher. Judge Williams
concurred with the majority opinion, but dissented with
regard to the issue of Dr. Knowles's standing and considered
the interests of a scientist engaging in research.25  Dr.
Knowles explained that the AWA's exemption for birds, mice,
252. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 801.
253. See supra Part II.F.
254. See Swanson, supra note 17, at 945.
255. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992).
256. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy 1), 23 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
257. Id. at 500-01.
258. See id. at 504-57 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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and rats impaired her ability to perform her professional
duties "because the ill treatment of experimental animals in
the institutions where she has worked has caused the loss of
'hundreds of data points' when her animal subjects were
deprived of food, water, a clean cage or a temperate
environment."2 59 It was contrary to Dr. Knowles's interests as
a scientist to continue research using animal subjects that
would not enable her to collect reliable data.26°
In addition, Dr. Knowles asserted aesthetic injury,
claiming that the mistreatment caused her "'personal
distress' at 'witnessing the plight of [mistreated] animals.' 26'
It is unclear why this asserted injury does not qualify as an
"injury in fact," especially when the Supreme Court has
recognized the satisfaction of watching animals in their
natural habitat as being concrete for Article III standing
purposes.262 According to Judge Williams, when evaluating
whether an injury is an "injury in fact," there is no difference
between observing a wild animal in its natural habitat and a
captive animal in a laboratory.263 Moreover, Dr. Knowles's
plans to return to research were not "speculative," because
she planned to do some follow-up research regarding her
doctoral dissertation and to continue her career in
psychobiology.264 Dr. Knowles's asserted injuries could be
addressed by an amendment to the AWA that would include
birds, rats, and mice in the list of regulated species.
In Espy 11, Dr. Fouts also made a strong argument for
259. Id. at 504 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260. Id. (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id. (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration
in original).
262. Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 504 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Williams cited Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,
478 U.S. 221 (1986), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), as
examples where the Supreme Court recognized aesthetic injury as an "injury in
fact." Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 504.
263. Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 505 ("The gulf between seeing experimental animals
decently treated and seeing them cruelly treated seems every bit as great as
that between seeing animals savoring their natural habitat and not seeing them
at all.").
264. Id. at 506. As Judge Williams noted, this assertion of future injury is
much less speculative than that claimed by the plaintiffs in Lujan because she
stated that she "will be required" to engage in future research that she has
already planned and failure will require her to forfeit her past investment in
psychobiological research. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64).
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standing, although the court ultimately rejected it.26 Fouts
claimed that he suffered an injury because he was prevented
from making plans to construct a research facility due to the
vagueness of USDA regulations.266 The court's decision to
deny standing in this case is questionable. Although the
court stated that the university, and not Fouts, would be
liable if the facility was found to be in violation of USDA
regulations, Fouts was still responsible to the university as
director of the research institute.267
Similarly, the court failed to recognize that Fouts
asserted a "distinct and palpable injury to himself."26' There
was imminent threat of injury, however, because Fouts likely
would have been personally responsible to the university if it
was found liable, and he therefore risked losing his position
as director. In addition, the USDA arguably caused Fouts's
hesitation to build the facility because its vague regulations
discouraged him from taking a risk.269  Finally, his injury
could have been redressed by clearer, definite, and more
specific regulations. The reluctance of the court to grant
standing to Dr. Fouts illustrates the difficulty that plaintiffs
face in overcoming this judicial barrier.
2. The Successful and Problematic Claim of Aesthetic
Injury
Currently, a claim of aesthetic injury resulting from
violations of the AWA appears to be the best chance that an
individual or an organization has to satisfy standing. 7 1
However, asserting a claim of aesthetic injury can be
problematic for two reasons. First, case law has not remained
consistent.271 A possible explanation for the inconsistency of
265. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy II), 29 F.3d 720, 725
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 723.
268. Id. at 725 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
269. Id.
270. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1028; St. John-Parsons, supra note 14, at
933; see also Proulx, supra note 14, at 530.
271. Compare Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (granting standing to a regular visitor of a zoo who observed animals
in conditions allegedly violating the AWA standards), with Animal Legal Def.
Fund, Inc. v. Espy (Espy 1), 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (refusing to grant
standing to a researcher plaintiff who observed laboratory animals under
alleged inhumane conditions).
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court decisions is that aesthetic injury is a subjective claim,
as noted by the dissent in Glickman.2  Second, aesthetic
injury does not directly address the issue of injury to the
animals themselves. A successful claim of aesthetic injury
redresses the alleged injuries of human plaintiffs that prefer
to observe the animals in more humane conditions rather
than injuries suffered by the animals. 3
Although the court found that Mr. Jurnove had standing
in Glickman,274 the court's reasoning is questionable. First,
Mr. Jurnove's assertion of aesthetic injury was based on his
inability to observe the animals in the conditions that he
desired for them.27 Because the Game Farm did not violate
USDA rules,276 Jurnove's injury was based on his personal
preference-a subjective rather than objective standard. It is
questionable whether a claim of injury based on personal
preference qualifies as "concrete and particularized" or
"actual or imminent."277  In addition, it can be argued that
Jurnove did not clearly prove his intent to return to the Game
Farm as required under Lujan.27' The fact that he visited the
facility many times and expressed interest in observing
animals did not necessarily mean that he had definite plans
to return. 2 9 Although Jurnove probably satisfied the injury
requirement under Justice Blackmun's standard in Lujan
based on past conduct,28 ° there is less certainty as to whether
272. See supra note 196.
273. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (stating that
plaintiffs must show that "one or more of [the plaintiffs' individual members]
would thereby be 'directly' affected apart from their 'special interest' in the
subject").
274. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 430-31.
275. See id. at 429.
276. Id.
277. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
278. See id. at 564. The plurality emphasized that "[sluch 'some day'
intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when the some day will be-do not support a finding of the
'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require." Id.
279. See id. Justice Scalia stated that the fact that "the [respondents] 'had
visited' the areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves nothing."
Id.
280. Id. at 591-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reasoned
that "[a] reasonable finder of fact could conclude, based not only upon their
statements of intent to return, but upon their past visits to the projects sites, as
well as their professional backgrounds, that it was likely that [the respondents]
would make a return trip to the project areas." Id. at 592.
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he satisfied the plurality's narrower standard.2 81  Second,
there is doubt as to whether the government caused Jurnove's
injury by failing to implement higher standards, particularly
in light of the dissent, which criticized the majority for
assuming that "the government causes everything that it does
not prevent."282 It is also debatable whether Jurnove satisfied
the causation requirement any more than Dr. Knowles or Dr.
Fouts, who both claimed that the government caused their
injuries.283
Finally, it is also unclear what standards the USDA must
set in order to redress Jurnove's injury adequately." As the
dissent pointed out, this is also subjective and depends on
what Jurnove finds to be aesthetically pleasing, satisfying, or
humane.285 In contrast, Dr. Knowles's injury could have been
redressed by including mice and rats as animals regulated
under the AWA.288 Similarly, Dr. Fouts's injury could have
been redressed by making USDA standards clearer so that he
would know whether or not his plans would violate AWA
standards. 287 Although Fouts's case and Jurnove's case both
involved changing standards, Jurnove's case required
changing the standards completely and creating a new set of
standards that would satisfy Jurnove's aesthetic taste.288 But
would a court order directing the USDA to promulgate new
standards redress Jurnove's injury? Even if new standards
were promulgated, if the Game Farm decided to sell its
animals to another exhibitor or facility, concluding that it
281. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-62.
282. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 452 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
283. Compare Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting standing to
lay zoo observer plaintiff who alleged that conditions of animals at a zoo
permitted by the USDA caused his injury), with Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Espy (Espy 1), 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying standing to researcher
plaintiff who alleged that the omission of mice and rats from the scope of
coverage of the AWA caused her injury), and Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Espy (Espy I), 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying standing to research
facility director plaintiff who alleged that vagueness of the AWA caused his
injury).
284. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 453-54 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 454 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that it is unclear
what improvements would satisfy Jurnove's aesthetic interests. Id.
286. See Espy I, 23 F.3d at 499-501.
287. See Espy H, 29 F.3d 722-23 (asserting that the regulations failed to
include statutorily mandated "minimum requirements').
288. See Glickman, 154 F.3d at 454 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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could not comply with the new standards due to financial or
other constraints, Jurnove would not be able to observe the
animals at the very place that he desired to observe them,
undermining any claims of redressability.5 9 In contrast,
Fouts's case merely involved clarifying current standards
through specifying minimum requirements.29 °  The
subjectivity of Jurnove's injury imposes a greater difficulty in
terms of redressability than the injuries of Dr. Knowles and
Dr. Fouts.
3. Conflict of Interest
A further problem related to litigating animal welfare
issues in federal court is that an individual who satisfies
standing requirements is often faced with a conflict of
interest. For example, researchers, such as graduate
students or post-doctoral fellows, who work in laboratories
that violate AWA standards probably have standing to bring
suit under the APA in a manner similar to Dr. Knowles's
claim in Espy 1.291 They would be in an even stronger position
than Dr. Knowles for standing purposes because they are
presently engaged in research, whereas Dr. Knowles had left
her research position at the time of the lawsuit. Although
these individuals would be in the best position to bring suit,
their primary interest as researchers is to conduct research
and establish a positive reputation in their fields, not to
litigate. Maintaining silence would do no harm to their
careers, whereas bringing a lawsuit could involve significant
risk. Not only would these researchers risk their current
positions, they would also risk their careers in their
respective fields. As a result, researchers are heavily pressed
289. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
290. See Espy 11, 29 F.3d 722-23.
291. See Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 499-500. The claim of such an individual would
be even stronger than Dr. Knowles's claim because her injury, whether it be
aesthetic or inability to engage in research, would be "actual" if she was
working at the lab that violated AWA standards. Therefore, such an individual
would satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement of Lujan. See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Asserting that the USDA's failure to
enforce AWA standards caused her injury would satisfy the causation
requirement. Espy I, 23 F.3d at 499-500. Finally, redressability would also be
satisfied because the USDA's enforcement of AWA standards would ameliorate
the conditions of the animals, redressing aesthetic injury and also allowing the
researcher to engage in research with animal subjects under conditions in
compliance with AWA standards. See id. at 561.
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not to bring a lawsuit, even if they suspect violations of AWA
standards.
4. Subjectivity and Lack of Predictability of Judges in
Applying the Standing Doctrine
The doctrine of standing is controversial and remains
ambiguous. Whether one satisfies standing requirements
seems to depend on the subjective interpretation of judges
more than any other factor.292 The disagreement among the
Justices in Lujan as to the application of the standard is
illustrative of this point.293  Justice Stevens, although
concurring in the judgment, did not agree with the Court's
conclusion that respondents lacked standing and that their
injury was not redressable.294 In addition, Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice O'Connor joined, was critical of the
plurality's formality in his dissenting opinion.295 In the
future, the requirements for standing might change,
depending on the Justices who sit on the bench.
This lack of predictability raises a barrier for animal
welfare organizations and individuals seeking standing to
protect animals. As Justice Blackmun asserted in Lujan,
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury."296  The present legal
conception of the standing requirement, particularly as
applied to animal welfare cases, prevents just that.
292. See supra note 196.
293. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 589-601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 581-582 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Although he
agreed with the judgment, Justice Stevens emphasized that he did not agree
with "the Court's conclusion that respondents lack[ed] standing because the
threatened injury to their interest in protecting the environment and studying
endangered species was not 'imminent.'" Id. He also did not agree with the
"plurality's additional conclusion that respondents' injury [was] not
'redressable.'" Id. Justice Stevens did not regard the respondents' asserted
injury as speculative and concluded that the only speculative aspect of the claim
was the genuineness of the respondents' intent to study or observe the animals.
See id. at 583-84.
295. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "[by
requiring a 'description of concrete plans' or 'specification' of when the some day
[for a return visit] will be, the Court... demands what is likely an empty
formality." Id. (citation omitted).
296. Id. at 606 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
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V. PROPOSAL
Protecting animals from abuse and cruelty requires
solutions by Congress as well as the judicial system. One
problem is that the APHIS has been unable to enforce AWA
provisions properly due to budgetary constraints.297  In
addition, the AWA gives great deference to researchers
because it does not regulate the content of experiments.298
Furthermore, it is counterintuitive to think that a researcher
seeking to obtain data from an experiment involving the
infliction of pain on an animal will actually report when such
pain becomes unnecessary. For researchers, it is both
economically and technically more efficient to use a method
that inflicts pain because alternative methods that would
relieve or decrease pain would increase costs due to the need
for more sophisticated techniques. It is therefore in the
interest of a researcher to assert that the infliction of pain is
"necessary."
Further, there is currently no person or organization that
can legally and objectively disprove this assertion. The
IACUC cannot interfere with the methods or content of
research, 299 and scientists familiar with and aware of
violations lack the legal capacity to sue because of the
standing requirement. In order to overcome these problems,
Congress should amend the AWA in order to ensure that it is
properly and effectively enforced. The judiciary must also
reconsider the standing doctrine as it applies to animal
welfare cases because of the difficulties the doctrine presents
in protecting animals from cruelty and abuse.
A. Through Congress: Amending the AWA to Create a Private
Right of Action Provision
To promote animal welfare, Congress should pass new
legislation amending the AWA to include a private right of
action provision 30 enabling plaintiffs to sue directly under the
AWA rather than the APA.3 0 1 However, it is unlikely that
297. Gardner, supra note 1, at 353.
298. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
299. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
300. See Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799
F.2d 934, 940 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that there is no private cause of action
under the AWA).
301. A private right of action provision, however, will not allow animals
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Congress will amend the AWA in this respect, as it has
already passed up this opportunity on several occasions." 2
Even if Congress enacted such legislation, it would only help
a plaintiff for standing purposes by removing the prudential
requirement. 3  Plaintiffs would still be required to meet the
constitutional requirements for standing. 4 Another solution
is to amend the AWA and create a new agency or a
subdivision of the USDA that specifically deals with animal
welfare issues. This possibility is discussed below.
B. Through the Judiciary: Animal Plaintiffs and Broader
Standing Requirements
Our judicial system has consistently served as a barrier
for animal welfare plaintiffs seeking to bring their cases
before a federal court.3 0 5  The judicial perception and
approach toward animal welfare cases must change in order
to protect animals effectively. The courts should either allow
interested individuals or organizations to bring claims on
behalf of animal plaintiffs or relax the narrow, formalistic
standing requirement to permit claims brought by animal
welfare organizations and interested individuals.3°6
The first option is similar to that of a parent or guardian
bringing a suit on behalf of a minor0 7 or an incompetent
individual. This status can also be compared to that of
themselves to bring suit and be named plaintiffs because such provisions have
used the language "any person may commence a civil suit." See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (2000) (emphasis added). Unless Congress defines a "person" to include
animals or enacts private right of action provisions granting animals the right
to bring suit, animals are precluded from bringing suit. See supra notes 225-27
and accompanying text.
302. See Swanson, supra note 17, at 964 (stating that amendments were
proposed in 1986 and 1989 to allow "any person to commence a civil action on
behalf of such person or on behalf of any animal protected by this Act to
compel ... enforcement"); Smith, supra note 14, at 1026-27 (citing H.R. 3223,
101st Cong. (1989)).
303. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 354.
304. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992).
305. See Hersini, supra note 7, at 149.
306. See Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1, at 1367 (asserting
that Congress should grant a private cause of action both to injured persons and
to animals themselves).
307. See Hannah, supra note 2, at 576-79. Hannah states that "[slome
lawyers in the animal rights field have advanced the theory that companion
animals are not property but have rights akin to those of a child." Id. at 576.
Moreover, a companion animal "has status for a minor member of the family
and thus is entitled to the same protection." Id. at 582.
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slaves, who were considered property,3° but nevertheless
were able to bring suit through a third party.0 9 Justice
Douglas proposed in his dissent in Sierra Club that courts
should confer standing upon inanimate environmental
objects, such as rivers and valleys, to sue for their own
preservation. 10 With this approach, interested third parties
having meaningful relations with animals could bring suit on
their behalf.
The second option follows from the origin of the standing
doctrine and the rule that the Court applied in Lujan.1
Historically, the American legal system granted standing to
strangers. 2  On its face, Article III of the Constitution does
not address standing, nor does it mention injury in fact.31 3
Traditionally, when Congress granted a right to sue, standing
did not require injury in fact. 4 Only within the last thirty-
five years has this phrase been used in relation to standing.1 5
Consequently, injury in fact is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for standing purposes.3 16 This formalistic
requirement of standing, which prevents people from suing
under congressionally authorized private right of action
provisions, is a creation of judges and has no historical or
textual basis. 17 In Lujan, Justice Kennedy asserted that
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
308. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)
(holding that slaves are not citizens, but property of the white race).
309. See Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1, at 1361 ("[Sllaves
were allowed to bring suit, often through a white guardian or 'next friend,' to
challenge servitude." (citing ROBERT B. SHAw, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVES IN
THE UNITED STATES 110 (1991))).
310. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas used a river as an example, asserting that
individuals with a meaningful relation to the environment, such as a fisherman,
a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger, could speak for its values. Id.
311. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
312. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 79, at 168-78
(discussing the history of standing in American law from England, the
American colonies, and early Congress).
313. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
314. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 79, at 170
(noting that "if a source of law conferred a right to sue, 'standing' existed,
entirely independently of 'concrete interest' or 'injury in fact.'").
315. See id. at 181-92. The first time the Supreme Court used the phrase
"injury in fact" was in 1970 in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Sunstein,
What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 79, at 169.
316. Id. at 235-36.
317. Id. at 166.
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chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before." 18 Under this view, a plaintiff
will have a cause of action as long as her injury qualifies as
the type of injury that Congress sought to vindicate.
Therefore, if Congress grants certain people a right to sue
under the Animal Welfare Act, the formalistic requirements
of standing have no basis to serve as a barrier.
C. Through a New Agency or Sub-Agency Specialized in
Animal Protection
The final and potentially most effective solution is to
create a new agency or a subdivision ("New Entity") of the
USDA that specializes in animal protection. Two main
changes to the AWA are required.3 1 9 First, the AWA should
be amended to allow the New Entity to regulate the design
and content of experiments.2 ° On an administrative level,
Congress should grant the New Entity the authority to make
rules and regulations concerning all aspects of animal care
and treatment in the context of scientific research. Second,
the AWA should be amended to limit the discretion of the
Secretary or head of the New Entity.2 '
318. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992).
319. The changes proposed here by no means reflect all of the changes
necessary to the AWA, but illustrate changes that should be made, using
amendments to 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (2000) as examples. It should be noted that the
current statutory text is shown in plain font, while the proposed amendments to
the text are shown in italics.
320. Amend 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A) by deleting subsections i, ii, and iii,
replacing them with
(6)(A) This chapter-
(i) shall apply to the handling and care of animals during actual
research and experimentation; and
(ii) shall authorize the Secretary, during inspection, to interrupt the
conduct of actual research or experimentation, as long as the research
facility has received notice regarding such inspection.
321. The following amendments to the AWA should be made:
1) Amend 17 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(D) as follows:
(D) that no animal is used in more than one major operative
experiment from which it is allowed to recover, except where there is no
feasible alternative; and
(E) that exceptions to such standards indicated by the use of the words
'necessary,' and 'except,' but not limited to them, may be made only
when specified by research protocol and that any such exception shall
be detailed and explained in a report outlined in paragraph (7) and
upon approval by the head of the New Entity and advisory committee.
2) Any provision granting the head of the New Agency authority to
promulgate rules and determine standards shall require the consultation of and
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These new rules and regulations would be promulgated
by the head of the New Entity in consultation with an
advisory committee.2 2 In addition, principal investigators
would be required to submit proposals to the New Entity
regarding their intended use of animals in their projects. 23
The New Entity would also be able to send an inspection
committee to any facility both with and without notice. 24
Facilities and principal investigators could then be given the
opportunity to cure any violation within a reasonable time or
face penalties. 25
approval of the advisory committee. As part of this amendment, amend 17
U.S.C. § 2143(a)(5) as follows:
(a)(5) In promulgating and enforcing the standards established
pursuant to this section, the head of the New Agency shall consult
experts, including outside consultants where indicated, and obtain
approval of the advisory committee.
322. The advisory committee would consist of nine members and include
various individuals with different backgrounds, such as medical doctors,
attorneys, scientists from various fields, veterinarians, other academics, and lay
members of the public who have an interest. With a diverse group of
individuals forming the committee, various perspectives can be taken into
account and the result would be as unbiased as possible. At least three
members would be required to have a background in veterinary medicine. At
least half of the members would be required to have two years of experience
either working with or scientifically researching animals.
323. This administrative procedure would be similar to that of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office for examining patent applications. See
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 422-30 (2003). Three examiners
who could either approve or disapprove the proposals would evaluate them.
Approval of the project by the New Entity will require approval by at least two
out of the three examiners. If less than two examiners approve the project, the
principal investigator will have the opportunity to amend the proposal and
resubmit it. If resubmission results in another rejection, the principal
investigator will have the opportunity to contest this decision before an
administrative panel consisting of five members. Panel members would have
the opportunity to question the investigator regarding possible violations of
rules and regulations in light of the examiners' decisions, and the investigator
would have the opportunity to respond to and rebut objections. Approval of the
proposal would require a majority of the panel members' votes. Disapproval by
the panel would constitute a final rejection. After a final rejection, the principal
investigator would be prohibited from amending and submitting a new proposal
for one year.
324. Amend 17 U.S.C. § 2143(b) to eliminate research facility committees.
The New Entity should conduct all inspections.
(b) Inspections
Each research facility shall comply with all inspections by the
inspection team of the New Entity, with and without notice.
325. Penalties should consist of monetary fines and/or suspension or
termination of animal use in research as specified under current 7 U.S.C. §
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The changes proposed here are only the beginning of a
solution. These dramatic changes are necessary to effectively
protect the welfare of animals, particularly in the scientific
research context. It is dangerous to leave decisions
completely in the hands of researchers without considering
the interests of others in society.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advances and discoveries in science, technology, and
medicine often come at the expense of animal pain and
suffering. Currently, federal law is ineffective in protecting
these animals, which are sacrificed for our own interests.
Although the purpose of the AWA is to protect the welfare of
animals under a federal statute, the USDA has been
ineffective in achieving this goal. The courts have also been
an ineffective means of enforcing the AWA due to the
formalistic and rigid requirements of the standing doctrine.
Similarly, Congress has also been unwilling to amend the
AWA to include a private right of action provision. As a
result, it has been difficult for individuals and organizations
to protect the welfare of animals under our legal system.
A possible solution to these difficulties is to create a new
entity with rulemaking, adjudicatory, and investigative
authority. Such an entity with comprehensive functions
would be most efficient and effective. Importantly, the AWA
should be amended to allow the New Entity to monitor and
regulate the use of animals during research and
experimentation. The most desirable solution would be to
permit plaintiffs with particularized interests in animal
welfare and protection, such as animal welfare organizations,
to represent animals and assert claims on their behalf before
a court of law. This would be the most direct solution in
protecting animals against abuse. However, as with many
legal issues, the most desirable solution is far from realistic,
and the only hope is that through the efforts of organizations,
individuals, Congress, and the judiciary, society will become
more educated, aware, and understanding of what must be
accomplished to protect animals.
2143(f).
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